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In the global political scandal that became known as the Iran-Contra Affair, various 
American diplomats were caught secretly and illegally selling weapons to Iran and using 
those funds to support anti-communist militias in Nicaragua. On the 9th of July 1987, 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North gave his opening statement to the Joint Iran-Contra 
Congressional Committee in the first of many televised hearings that would follow: 
One thing is, I think, for certain: that you will not investigate yourselves in this 
matter. There is not much chance that you will conclude at the end of these hearings 
that… the Administration acted properly by trying to sustain the freedom fighters in 
Nicaragua when they were abandoned. And you are not likely to conclude by 
commending the President of the United States, who tried valiantly to recover our 
citizens and achieve an opening with strategically vital Iran. 
I would not be frank with you if I did not admit that the last several months have 
been very difficult for me and my family. It has been difficult to be on the front pages 
of every newspaper in the land day after day, to be the lead story on national 
television day after day, to be photographed thousands of times by bands of 
photographers, who chase us around since November just because my name arose at 
the hearings…  
But I am going to walk from here with my head high and my shoulders straight 
because I am proud of what we accomplished. I am proud of the efforts that we 
made. And I am proud of the fight that we fought. I am proud of serving in the 
Administration of a great President.1 
 
This speech perfectly personifies the discourse in which the Iran-Contra affair has been 
embedded, featuring a flawed but noble character willing to break the law in order to prove 
his unshakeable dedication to his country and president. The Iran-Contra affair is usually 
followed by parentheses that state ‘(1985-1987),’ as if to suggest that the scandal had no 
significant background prior to 1985 or repercussions after 1987. It has largely been treated 
as an American domestic political scandal that was uncovered in the mid-1980s and then 
solved by the Congressional hearings of 1987. This perspective not only ignores the military 
and political ramifications of the affair in Nicaragua and Iran, but also omits one of the most 
                                           
1 Oliver North, “Opening Statement to Joint Iran Contra Congressional Committee.” American Rhetoric: Online 
Speech Bank, 1986, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/olivernorthfrancontrahearing.htm. 
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important actors in this international arms trade: Israel. 
 The historical literature concerning Israel’s role in the Iran-Contra affair is minimal. 
On the surface, the lack of material written on the Israeli contribution to Iran-Contra suggests 
that it was only a minor middleman. However, in examining the history of Israel’s 
international arms dealing, it becomes apparent that Israel played a significant role in Iran-
Contra. Israel’s role as an arms salesman dates back to the 1950s in Iran and the 1930s in 
Nicaragua; its investments in Central America and Iran were just as significant as American 
investments; and in many instances, the United States based their policies on a precedent that 
Israel had already set.  
Israeli agency was crucial in moulding and creating the circumstances under which 
the Iran-Contra Affair emerged. 
 
Background History of Nicaragua 
American interventions in Nicaragua 1936-1979 
 After 1848, the United States made a practice of intervening militarily in Nicaragua 
and other Latin American countries under the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny and “Dollar 
Diplomacy.”2 Manifest Destiny was the belief that the US would and should expand its 
borders across the continent in order to spread the fruits of its so called “democratic” 
civilisation. Once the boundaries of the US reached the Pacific Ocean, the country began to 
expand towards its southern neighbours. However, instead of annexing territory, the US used 
military interventions and threats of force against various governments in the Western 
Hemisphere to allow friendly conditions for American companies to invest in a policy that 
                                           





become known as “Dollar Diplomacy.” 
Although the US economy and its companies benefited greatly from expansion in the 
Western Hemisphere, most Latin American citizens remained in poverty with the exception of  
the elites who collaborated with outside interests.3 Throughout Latin America and 
particularly Central America, armed protests against pro-American business elites occurred 
almost every year between 1898 and 1936.4 The United States often resorted to military 
force to quell these rebellions, and imposed friendly authoritarian leaders to maintain 
unlimited access to Central America’s gold, fruit, and shipping lanes.5 
 Nicaragua, in particular, proved a significant sources of US investments, particularly 
after 1909, when the US introduced a garrison of a few hundred troops to surround the US 
embassy.6 American general Smedley Butler characterised the deployment in his diaries 
from 1909 to 1912. As he put it: “everybody was happy, the Gold mines and fruit companies 
operated unmolested, and canal schemes were plotted all over the country for years.”7 
Butler’s troops were there to ensure that these companies were to remain ‘unmolested,’ he 
wrote. 
 In 1926, after multiple leadership changes in Nicaragua, a young revolutionary 
general Augusto Nicolas Sandino, revolted against American corporate and military control in 
                                           
3 Due to the frequency of US interventions, Central America held very little economic and military autonomy. 
The Panama Canal, constructed in 1914, was the ultimate symbol of American economic supremacy. The 
Panama Canal was paid for by American investors and built by indigenous labour. The canal and a zone of 8km 
around it were to remain a US overseas territory until 1999 as stated in the 1977 Torrijos Carter Treaties. The 
US wanted to safeguard its investments in Panama as well as maintain its role as a dominant supervisor for 
economic development and industrialisation. 
4 Bermann, Under the Big Stick. 
5 Sklar, Holly. Washington's War on Nicaragua. (Boston, MA: South End, 1988) 2. 
 
6 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, 3. 
 
7 Major General Smedley D. Butler, “America’s Armed Forces,” Part 3, “’Happy Days Are Here Again’: The 
Navy,” pp. 13-14. 1935. 
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a bloody six-year guerrilla war. This contributed to a temporary expulsion of American troops 
in 1933.8 Sandino’s victory immortalised him throughout Latin America as a symbol of 
resistance against American imperialism.9 His grand reputation was not only due to his 
military prowess, but also due to his economically modest background as a ‘common man.’ 
Sandino’s speeches were widely circulated, especially in Mexico, and paintings of his stories 
were romanticised by artists throughout the region. This inspiration carried on into the 1970s 
where the Sandinistas would name their organisation after Sandino.  
However, Sandino’s victory was short lived; he was assassinated in 1934 by pro-US 
rebels armed with American guns.10 Sandino was replaced by General Anastasio Somoza 
Garcia whose National Guards came to power in 1936.11 Somoza, nicknamed El Yanqui for 
his Philadelphia bred English, was seen by the majority of Nicaraguans as an American 
puppet and despot.12 His political opponents were subjected to electrical shocks, repeated 
near-drownings, imprisonment in coffin-sized cells, or incarceration in the Somoza’s personal 
zoo alongside lions and panthers.13 In 1956 he declared “I’ll give this country peace, if I 
have to shoot every other man in Nicaragua to get it.”14 Somoza’s successors, first his 
brother and then his son, proved to be just as brutal and pro-American. Somoza Debayle 
declared that he was more comfortable speaking English than Spanish and that he knew “the 
                                           
8 American troops were already scheduled to pull out in 1933, but Sandino’s constant fighting against the US 
presence gave his supporters the impression that he was the primary reason why the US retreated. 
9 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, 4. 
 
10 Knut Walter, The Regime of Anastasio Somoza, (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1993). 
11 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, 5. 
12 Bermann, Under the Big Stick, 219-226. 
13 John, Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2nd ed. 
1985). 
14 Alejandro Bendana, “Crisis in Nicaragua,” NACLA Report on the Americas, November-December 1978, p. 2, 
citing Time, October 8 1956. 
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US better than my country.”15 He and his brother were fiercely anti-communist and 
supported American “containment” around the world.16 The Somozas allowed the US to 
launch troops from Nicaraguan soil to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs in 1961, offered to 
send troops to Vietnam, sent troops alongside the US in the 1965 invasion of the Dominican 
Republic, put US Ambassador Turner Shelton on the 20 Corboda Bill (equivalent to 3 USD), 
and donated $1 million to Richard Nixon’s re-election campaign in 1972.17  
 
Israel’s relationship with Somoza 1939-1979 
The United States was not the only close ally of Somoza. Starting in 1939, Somoza 
developed a very strong relationship with what would become the state of Israel. During the 
beginning stages of World War Two, Somoza provided agents with diplomatic covers 
necessary for the selling of arms to the Haganah, the Zionist military force in mandate 
Palestine. The Haganah needed arms not only to fight the Axis but also to combat both the 
British and the Arabs after the war. Some splinter groups such as the Irgun started attacking 
the British with Nicaraguan arms as early as late 1944.18 In 1947, the Haganah paid Somoza 
over $200,000 and a large diamond for arms and passports needed by Haganah dealers to buy 
weapons from other European countries.19 The Haganah were instrumental in expanding the 
                                           
15 Robert A. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princess 
University Press, 1987), p. 54. 
16 Abraham Lowenthal, “The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption,” Foreign 
Affairs, October 1976. 
17 Walter LeFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1984), p. 226, citing Diederich, Somoza, pp. 88-89. John Huey, Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1978. 
 
18 Edy Kaufman, Yoram Shapira and Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Books, 1979), p. 108. See also Newsweek, November 20, 1978, p. 68; Bishara A. Bahbah, Israel 
and Latin America: The Military Connection (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), p. 132, and Israeli Foreign 
Affairs 1/1 (December 1984), p. 3. 
 
19 Jane Hunter. "Israeli Arms Sales to Central America: An Overview." WRMEA. January 1987. Accessed 
December 2, 2015 http://www.wrmea.org/1987-january/israeli-arms-sales-to-central-america-an-overview.html. 
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borders of the UN partitioned Jewish territory into the modern state of Israel in 1948; and 
Nicaragua was one of the first countries to support the creation of a Jewish state via 
partition.20 
 Starting in the mid to late 1950s, the dynamics of the relationship between Nicaragua 
and Israel changed as Israel became the primary seller of arms to Somoza. Israel referred to 
Managua as a part of their ‘special relationship.’21 In February 1957, a Nicaraguan 
delegation to Israel negotiated a $1.2 million arms deal with Shimon Peres who was the 
director general of the Israeli Defence Ministry.22According to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), by the 1970s Israel accounted for 98% of Nicaragua’s arms 
imports.23 This included tanks, light aircraft, armoured cars, ammunition, and automatic 
rifles.24 In early 1978, Somoza changed his National Guard’s standard arms from the 
American Garan M-1, to the modern Israeli Galil assault rifle.25 Some members of the 
National Guard were also armed with Israeli made lightweight UZI submachine guns.26 In 
                                           
20 "United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181." - Wikisource, the Free Online Library. November 29, 
1947. Accessed November 16, 2015. 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_181. 
21 Sadowski Yahya, "Israel in Central America | Middle East Research and Information Project." Israel in 




22 Matti Golan, Shimon Peres: A Biography (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982), 81. 
23 Other sources report that during this period the US remained the major provider of arms and training to 
Somoza’s National Guard. See Marc Edelman, “Lifelines: Nicaragua and the Socialist Countries,” NACLA 
Report on the Americas 19/3 (May-June 1985), p. 37 and Newsweek, November 20, 1978, p. 68. The SIPRI 
information is from World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1980 (London: Taylor and Francis, 
1980), p. 96. 
24 "Nicaragua 201 Israel." Nicaragua 201 Israel. Accessed August 14, 2015. 
http://www.cascoscoleccion.com/nicaragu/nica201.htm. 





January 1979, a group of American diplomats expressed concern over Somoza’s military 
overconfidence, that “one reason Somoza was so cocky in resisting pressures to resign was 
the knowledge that Israel, which had been a full-times arms salesman working the countries 
of the Caribbean Basin, could and would supply whatever the National Guard needed.”27  
Although Nicaragua was Israel’s biggest ally in Central America, it was by no means 
the only one. SIPRI numbers estimate than between 1975 and 1979, 83% of El Salvador’s 
defence imports were from Israel including chemical weapons such as napalm.28 El 
Salvador’s infamous secret police ANSESAL, as well as Guatemala’s death squads who were 
responsible for the ethnic cleansing of its Mayan population, were all supplied by Israeli and 
American weapons.29 By 1979, Israel had a global reputation as a large-scale arms dealer, 
not only did it supply more arms to the Somoza regime than the United States, but also 
rivalled the US in supplying weaponry to Argentina, Honduras, Chile, Brazil, Taiwan, 
Portugal, Spain, and South Africa.30 The US was primarily involved in controlling 
Nicaragua’s agricultural and gold production while Israel was primarily involved in 
supplying weapons; and when Nicaragua started to implode with revolutionary unrest in the 
mid-1970s, both countries feared the safety of their respective economic investments.31 
 
The rise of the Sandinistas and the overthrow of Somoza 1979 
 The Sandinistas, a Marxist inspired revolutionary organisation founded in 1961, 
sought to regain economic independence from American influence using the same tactics as 
                                           
27 Shirley Christian. Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. (New York: Random House), 92.  
28 SIPRI, p. 97. See also Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1981. Klieman (Israel’s Global Reach, p. 134) 
29 Hunter. "Israeli Arms Sales to Central America: An Overview." 
30 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, 21. 
31 Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua, the Land of Sandino (Boulder, CO: West View Press), 38. 
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Sandino. However, the Sandinistas did not gain widespread support among the population 
until a devastating earthquake in 1972. When news emerged of National Guardsmen selling 
donated relief goods from abroad and preventing aid from being dispersed to the population, 
support for the Sandinistas swelled into an armed revolution.32 An extremely bloody civil 
war arose and Somoza responded by using a death squad named the Anti-Communist League, 
which was notorious for widespread torture, rape, killings, mass arrests, and 
disappearances.33 
 Despite the destruction in Nicaragua, American advertisements still treated 
Nicaragua in the way Smedley Butler had described in 1909. On May 31 1977, the Wall 
Street Journal ran a two-page advertisement titled “Nicaragua: An Investor’s Dream Come 
True.”34 The US Department of Commerce predicted that “Nicaragua will continue to enjoy 
political stability and a bright economic future.”35 However, the extreme violence of the 
regime started to turn some liberal American politicians against Somoza, and President 
Jimmy Carter started to pressure Somoza to improve his human rights record.36 These efforts 
to liberalise Somoza were too little and too late and the Sandinistas came to power in July 
1979, and the US and Israel lost an important ally.37 As similar revolutions threatened to 
break out throughout Central America, Israel was concerned that its market for weapons 
would dry up while the US was worried that a power vacuum would let the Soviet Union 
                                           
32 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, 9. 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: 




36 Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua, 15. 
37 Peter Kornbluh. “The US Role in the Counterrevolution” in Revolution & Counter Revolution in Nicaragua, 
ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 324. 
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spread communism in their ‘backyard.’38 Meanwhile, a similar revolution with a similar 
history was going on halfway around the world in Iran. 
 
Background history of Iran 
British and American interventions in Iran 1945-1953 
 During the nineteenth century, Qajar power faced significant decline in the face of 
growing Russian and British imperial influence. Iran was invaded by Commonwealth and 
Russian/Soviet forces during both world wars due to its economic ties to Germany as well as 
their longstanding economic ambitions in Iran.39 Each occupation produced concessions for 
British, Russian, and later American, oil companies. The most infamous of these corporations 
was the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, known today as British Petroleum, which operated the 
world’s largest refinery with virtual independence from the state.40 The company owned its 
own roads and airports and negotiated with other entities without state approval.41 Iran’s oil 
fields were vital to its economy; more workers were employed in the oil fields than in all 
other industries combined.42 British control over these industries was so total that it 
effectively denied sovereignty to the Iranian economy.43 Iranians fiercely objected to having 
                                           
38 Mauricio Solaun, U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2005). Notes. Bibliography. Index. xii, 391. See more in Hispanic American Historical Review (215): 
http://hahr.dukejournals.org/content/87/1/180.full.pdf+html?sid=0a47e57c-3b64-485c-891e-8de52975e866. 
39 Nikki R. Keddie & Yann Richard, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 2003) 101. 
 
40 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 102. 
 
41 William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, 2009). 
42 M. W. Thornburg, “An Economic Study of the Near East with Particular Reference to Oil Revenues 
(unpublished study, 1944), 25-29. 
 




no say in the company, no right to see its books, and to pay high prices for their own oil.44 
In the post-WWII era, as anger rose over ongoing British imperialism, Iranians 
overwhelmingly voted for Mohammed Mosaddegh’s National Front into power in 1951.45 
Mosaddegh’s declaration nationalising the Anglo-Persian oil companies easily won him 
support from a diverse political spectrum, including the secular and religious ulama 
populations.46 Britain, already in a state of global decline, did not want to lose access to 
Iran’s resources and convinced the United States that Iran was on the verge of a communist 
revolution under the guidance of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party, a socialist political 
organisation formed in 1941.47 In 1953 the CIA and MI6 orchestrated a joint coup d'état that 
removed Mossddegh from power and reinstated the Shah of Iran as an absolute monarch.48 A 
year after the coup, the company signed another agreement with the Shah’s government that 
gave over control of oil production, marketing, and 50% of the profits, to foreign cartel 
companies.49 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could once again conduct business as it had 
always done. 
 
The Shah and the Iranian Revolution 1953-1980 
The Shah, now granted complete authority over the country, cracked down on 
political opposition and enjoyed over $200 million in American loans for military equipment 
from 1953 to 1963.50 The Shah’s authoritarianism was conducted largely through the use of 
                                           
44 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 123. 
 
45 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 124 
46 Elwell-Sutton, L. P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics. (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1975) Ch. 13-14. 
 
47 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 107. 
 
48 Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008) 154. 
 
49 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 130. 
50 H Algar, “The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran,” in N.R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, 
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SAVAK, a secret police with American and Israeli advisers, who brutally tortured and 
executed those who publicly opposed the state’s rule.51 Structurally, a two party state existed 
but in reality it was a thin veil that covered up the Shah’s dictatorship.52 Some referred to the 
system as the ‘yes’ and ‘yes sir’ parties.53 
During the early 1960s, a man named Ruhollah Khomeini started to openly criticise 
the Shah’s relationship with the United States and Israel, as well as the regime’s overall 
corruption and granting of capitulations to foreigners.54 Khomeini was an Iranian scholar and 
lecturer who started his political career by critiquing the Shah’s White Revolution of 1963 
that sought to westernise and industrialise Iran. Khomeini’s criticisms led to his arrest by 
SAVAK officials later that year. By then, Khomeini had become a well-known political 
commentator, and news of his arrest caused uproar and protests. The demonstrations were 
violently suppressed by the military and caused thousands of deaths. Khomeini lived the next 
fifteen years in exile in Turkey, Iraq, and France, where he continued preach against the 
Shah’s rule and spread his political philosophy.55 Cassette tapes containing his recorded 
lectures were smuggled into Iran where hundreds of thousands listened to them secretly.56 
Khomeini believed in using Islamic principles to mobilise the masses and apply them to 
contemporary issues. Despite Khomeini’s emphasis on Islam, he gained widespread secular 
                                           
Saints, and Surfs (Berkely and Los Angeles 1972) page 246. 
51 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 147. 
 
52 Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale UP 1989) 25. 
53 Cleveland & Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East. 
54 Abrahamia. The Iranian Mojahedin. 
55 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 148. 




Meanwhile, the Shah’s continued obsession with western products and unpopular 
reforms undermined his support throughout the nation. His 1963 White Revolution did 
benefit some members of the population through industrialisation, women’s rights, 
healthcare, and literacy, but it undercut the rural bazaari economy, and maintained the British-
American oil oligopoly.58 The Shah mishandled the 1973 OPEC boycott by throwing huge 
sums of money into the economy, causing inflation and shortages. Meanwhile, the Shah 
boasted of turning Iran into one of the world’s “five great powers with average incomes equal 
to the best.”59 In addition, the Shah’s immense personal expenses outraged the middle and 
lower classes. In 1971, the Shah celebrated Iran’s pre-Islamic past by commemorating ‘2,500 
years of monarchy’ with lavish events costing over 20 million dollars.60 This celebration was 
accompanied by jumping from the Muslim year of 1355 to the royalist year 2535 which 
irritated Iran’s religious population.61 Other stories of the Shah circulating amongst the 
public, including tales of flying in wine straight from France, greatly contributed to the rapid 
decline in support during the 1970s. Islamists felt themselves being westernised by the Shah’s 
secular policies including the employment of over 60,000 foreign technicians and military 
advisers by 1977.62 In addition, the funding of the Shah’s army, and particularly the air force, 
by the United States, made many members of the public draw a direct connection with the US 
                                           
57 Cleveland & Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East. 
58 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 168. 
 
59 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 163. 
 
60 Keddie & Richard, Modern Iran, 167. 
61 Abrahamia. The Iranian Mojahedin, 26. 
 
62 Cleveland & Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East. 
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and the Shah’s ability to repress protest.63 By the late 1970s, most Iranians saw the Shah as a 
western puppet with no interest in the population. In 1975, Amnesty International branded 
Iran as having one of the worst human rights records on the planet.64  
 Protest turned into revolution during the end of 1977. The death of Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s son, Mostafa, was followed by Khomeini’s call for forty days of mourning. The 
mourning turned into protest which was suppressed violently. This resulted in another forty 
days of mourning which was also bloodily repressed. This forty-day cycle repeated several 
times and resulted in protests involving tens of thousands in multiple cities across the 
country.65 By 1979, the Shah fled into exile and Khomeini returned to Tehran and was 
greeted by an estimated two million people.66 
 News of the Shah being admitted in the United States for cancer treatment sparked a 
new phase of the revolution. Outraged students stormed the American embassy and held the 
staff hostage for the next 444 days which captured global headlines.67 This boosted support 
for Khomeini but the country was still in chaos and by 1980 Iraq invaded Iran. Iraq’s leader, 
Saddam Hussein, hoped to take advantage of Iran’s revolutionary chaos and plunged the two 
countries into a state of bloody war that would largely result in a stalemate by 1988. 
 
Israeli investments in Iran, Nicaragua, and Lebanon 
                                           
63 Middle East arms sales proposals: hearings ... Ninety-fifth Congress, second session on proposed U.S. sales 
of fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel, May 3, 4, 5, and 8, 1978, 36. See more at: 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011338579. 
 
64 Amnesty International, Annual Report for 1974-75 (London, 1975). 
 
65 Abrahamia. The Iranian Mojahedin, 31 
66 Cleveland & Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East. 




Likud politics and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 1977-1982 
 Israel viewed the Iranian Revolution with the same dismay as the United States. The 
Shah’s Iran was Israel’s biggest regional ally and one of Israel’s largest clients in the 
weapons industry. The new right wing Likud government, which broke the Labour Party’s 
continuous streak of victories in 1977, feared that Iran’s rhetoric would translate into material 
support for Palestinians living in the occupied territories.68 Likud’s leader, Menachem Begin, 
looked towards Israel’s neighbour in the north, Lebanon. Lebanon had fallen into a 
devastating civil war in 1975 and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were launching 
raids into Israel from southern Lebanon.69 Begin also initiated the first major wave of settlers 
into the West Bank. Begin felt that if the PLO could be expelled from Lebanon, then it would 
isolate the Palestinians in the West bank and absorb the territory more easily into the Israeli 
state.70 Begin gave the order to invade in 1982.71 
 Unfortunately for Begin, the war in Lebanon proved to be extremely unpopular 
within Israel and around the world. The war’s length, guerrilla fighting, low troop morale, 
and documented cases of mass civilian killings such as the infamous Sabra and Shatila 
massacres, reminded many commentators of the American experience in Vietnam.72 The war 
did nothing to isolate the Palestinians in the West Bank, and the First Intifada erupted only a 
few years later in 1987. Even though the primary objective, to get rid of the PLO presence in 
                                           
68 Kristen E. Schulze. “Israel-Lebanese Relations: A Future Imperfect?” in Lebanon’s Second Republic: 
Prospects for the Twenty-first century, ed. Kail C. Ellis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida 2002) 58. 
69 Schulze. “Israel-Lebanese Relations: A Future Imperfect?” 28, 32.  
70 Cleveland & Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East. 
71 Schulze. “Israel-Lebanese Relations: A Future Imperfect?” 34. 
72 Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal 
Conflict (Columbia University Press: New York) 44. 
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Lebanon, succeeded, the problem was replaced by a new organisation, Hezbollah.73 This 
Shi’i organisation rose up in response to the Israeli invasion and received Iranian backing in 
the form of weapons, training, and over two billion dollars in the early 1980s74. Iran needed 
foreign allies to legitimise its new government and Hezbollah did so with enthusiasm despite 
being branded a terrorist organisation by most countries in the world.75 
 Hezbollah did not only concern Israel, but also the United States. In 1982, Hezbollah 
abducted 96 Americans and Western Europeans in Beirut. In 1983, the militant group bombed 
the US embassy and barracks in Beirut inflicting almost three hundred casualties.76 
Hezbollah also enjoyed the full support of Syria, who also had a large stake in the ongoing 
civil-war.77 The United States did not want Lebanon to become a puppet of Iran or controlled 
by the PLO.78 Since Iran greatly influenced Hezbollah with their funding, the US wanted to 
pressure the Iranians to order Hezbollah to release the 96 hostages. Iran expressed confidence 
about the release of American hostages but asked for 100 TOW missiles delivered from Israel 
in return.79 This leverage was a significant thread in the Iran-Israel-American triangle. Oliver 
North laid out a deal called Operation Recovery, where the US would send weapons to Iran 
via Israel in exchange for Hezbollah to release a French hostage: 
Deliveries would commence on or about 12 December as follows:  
                                           
73 Schulze. “Israel-Lebanese Relations: A Future Imperfect?” 63. 
74 August Richard Norton Hizbollah of Lebanon: From Political Realism to Mundane Politics (New York: 
Council of Foreign Relations 1999).  
75 Cleveland & Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East. 
76 Schulze. “Israel-Lebanese Relations: A Future Imperfect?” 34. 
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H-hr: 1 707 w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT 
H+10hrs: 1 707 (same A/C) w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT 
H+16hrs: 1 747 w/50 HAWKs & 400 TOWs = 2 AMCITs 
H+20hrs: 1 707 w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT 
H+24hrs: 1 747 w/2000 TOWs = French Hostage80 
 
Lebanon was now a battleground between Israel, the US, and Hezbollah, the PLO, Syria, and 
Iran.81 The Israelis and Americans were overwhelmingly concerned with the future of the 
region’s stability and both decided that covert operations would work better than direct 
military interventions. 
 
Israeli incentives to partake in Iran-Contra 
There were two primary incentives for Israel to partake in the Iran-Contra Affair. The 
first was to maintain the balance of power between Iran and Iraq so that neither country could 
pose a threat to Israel. The second incentive was to maintain military and economic alliances 
in Central America at a time when most countries in the world were severing diplomatic ties 
with Israel.82  
 Israel viewed Iran as a lesser evil than Iraq. Although Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric 
was just as anti-Israeli as Saddam Hussein’s, the Iraqi army prior to 1986 was far more 
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powerful than the Iranian armed forces. In the early 1980s, most political commentators 
around the world predicted a swift and easy victory for Hussein’s armies because Iraq had 
better weapons and Iran was still in the midst of revolutionary chaos.83 In addition, Jordan, 
Syria, and Egypt supported the Iraqi military while Iran had very few allies.84 Iraq is also 
geographically closer to Israel which meant it was potentially feasible for Iraq to stage a 
military engagement. The Israelis took a realist approach and decided that the best possible 
outcome for Israel was for both Iran and Iraq to be militarily and economically weakened in a 
long drawn out war.85 
In order to level the playing field by perpetuating an ongoing stalemate, Israel 
decided to sell weapons to Iran. A decision well described by Secretary of State Cyrus 
Roberts Vance, in 1987: “I think that is one reason that Israel has been providing arms to Iran, 
because it wants to keep Iraq with its face towards the East [Iran] and away from Israel.”86 
Israel did not only support Iran through arms sales, but also by bombing a French built 
nuclear reactor just south of Baghdad on June 8 1981.87 This was a significant move for 
Israel, as it was the first time Israel had attacked a country that it did not border. Even the 
United States condemned this move in a UN resolution.88  
                                           
83 Samuel Segev. The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair. (New York: 
Free Press 1988) 21 
84 Segev, The Iranian Triangle, 22 
85 Bryne, Iran Contra. Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power, 73. 
 
86 United States policy toward Iran: hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
One hundredth Congress, first session, January 14, 16, 23, and 27, 1987. See more at: (22) 
http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/009863274. 
 
87 The Israeli air strike: hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-
seventh Congress, first session, on the Israeli air strike and related issues, June 18, 19, and 25, 1981. See more 
at: (1) http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007608648. 
 
88 Lara Friedman. "Israel’s Unsung Protector: Obama." The New York Times. April 10, 2016. Accessed April 
12, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/opinion/international/israels-unsung-protector-obama.html. 
Smith 20 
 
Iran was well aware of Israel’s incentives and even addressed Israeli concerns over 
Iraq on April 9 1985.89 In exchange for weapons, Iran offered Israel three captured Iraqi T-72 
Soviet made Tanks. These were not for military use, as the outdated T-72 was nicknamed the 
“tractor” by Israeli soldiers, but instead were for study. Almost all of Syria’s and Iraq’s tanks 
were based on the Soviet T-72 and Israel had not had a chance to physically examine the 
tanks before.90 Iran knew that there was a likely chance that Israel would conflict with Syria 
and Iraq again sometime in the future, and that a study of their tanks could be useful.  
 The second incentive for Israel to partake in Iran-Contra was to maintain its global 
influence at a time when most countries were cutting off diplomatic relations with Israel. By 
1979, Tel-Aviv had become very isolated. In protest of Israel’s involvement in the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, almost every country in south Asia and Africa severed their relations with Tel-
Aviv. Many of these countries were going through a very nationalistic decolonisation phase 
and grouped Israel into the same category as their former European imperialists. In Africa, 
Israel maintained diplomatic and military relations with just four countries: Rhodesia, 
Portuguese Mozambique, Portuguese Angola, and South Africa, all white settler colonies. 
Therefore, Israel was desperate to maintain its foreign military links that it still had in Central 
America. This meant that the Sandinistas were a direct threat to Israel’s interests as the 
communists also viewed themselves as fighting a war against colonisation.91 In addition, the 
Israelis held similar ideological views as many anti-communist Central American states, 
which historian Dr. Jamail Milton described as: 
The self-perception of some Central American regimes as internationally isolated and 
politically undervalued, trapped in a political state of siege, usually on the basis of 
their atrocious records of human rights abuses. They presume, in other words, a 
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political affinity with Israel as a fellow “pariah state.”92 
 
Although this is not the primary reason behind Israel’s support of the Contras, it does explain 
the origins of funding from other “pariah states,” including Taiwan, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, and Portugal.93 All of these countries had few allies due to global criticism of 
their human rights abuses and authoritarian right wing governments. 
 The United States understood Israel’s concern with its increasing isolation and 
responded in 1984 by organising a joint political-military committee to coordinate “third 
world” activities. The United States would fund Israeli development assistance programmes 
in Africa in exchange for Israel stepping up its role in Central America.94 
 
Misperceptions of Israeli incentives to partake in Iran-Contra 
 One common misconception that explain Israel’s incentives to support Somoza’s 
National Guards and the Contras, is that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation had links to 
the Sandinistas dating back to the 1960s.95 Although this was true, the PLO had no practical 
influence in Latin America and the vast majority of support was simply decolonisation 
rhetoric. By 1982, the PLO was far more concerned with attempting to reconnect with the 
Palestinian people it was supposedly representing, while in exile in Tunis. A 1982 report by 
the New Jewish Agenda, a progressive Jewish political organisation in the United States, 
dismissed the idea of Israel being concerned of a pro-PLO lobby in Latin America by stating 
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“while they certainly have a history of support for and cooperation with the PLO, which 
maintains an office in Managua, the Sandinistas appear far less concerned with the Middle 
East than they do with Israeli policies as they affect Central America.”96Despite the total lack 
of evidence, the belief that the PLO was a major contributor to Israeli intervention in 
Nicaragua was even shared by the US Department of State which tried to draw a link between 
the Sandinistas and Islamic extremists in a 1985 report entitled “The Sandinistas and Middle-
East Radicals.97 
 Another similar misconception commonly used to explain Israeli incentives to 
support the Contras was that the Sandinistas were supposedly anti-Semitic.98 This anti-
Semitic argument was first used by the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1986 as 
propaganda to justify supporting the Contras.99 In May 1983 the Anti-Defamation League of 
B’nai B’rith issued a report claiming that “the Sandinista government has forced the 
country’s entire Jewish community into exile, confiscating Jewish-owned property and taking 
over the synagogue in Managua.”100 In July 1983, President Reagan supported the Anti-
Defamation League by claiming that “virtually the entire Jewish community of Nicaragua has 
been frightened into exile.”101 Even some Democrat party members agreed with this notion 
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including Representative Michael Barnes, a spokesman on Central American policy, who 
accused the Sandinistas of “government sponsored anti-Semitism.”102 In March 1986, 
Reagan made an appeal to American Jews to support a $100 million aid package to the 
Contras by claiming that “our supply lines to Israel and NATO run through the Caribbean.”103 
A few days later, Vice President Bush accused the Sandinistas of using “Nazi-like tactics” 
and declared that “the fate of Nicaragua’s Jewish community gives a picture of what is at 
stake.”104 However, these claims were immediately criticised by multiple Jewish 
organisations for politicising the Holocaust with distorted evidence.105 
 In 1979, the population of Nicaragua’s Jews was approximately 200.106 Although it 
was true that Jewish property was confiscated and that many were forced into exile, this was 
not undertaken because of their religion, but because all property owning elites with ties to 
Somoza were targeted. The 200 Jews just happened to be a part of the pro-Somoza property 
owning elite forced to flee alongside thousands of other pro-Somoza property-owning elite 
Nicaraguans from various religious and ethnic backgrounds. The Anti-Defamation League 
report, which was the main piece of ‘evidence’ used for the anti-Semitic charge, was based 
almost exclusively upon the testimony of two Nicaraguan exiles, Isaac Stavisky and his 
father, Abraham Gorn, both of whom had worked with the Somoza regime. In 1984, a group 
of progressive Israeli Knesset members visited Nicaragua and stated that the anti-Semitism 
charge had “been blown way out of proportion by the Reagan administration, in order to 
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encourage American Jews to support its policies in Central America.”107 In 1983, the 
American ambassador in Managua Anthony Cecil Eden Quainton, undertook extensive 
research concerning the anti-Semitic charges.108 A few months later, Quainton reported to 
Washington and concluded that “no verifiable evidence” had been uncovered to prove 
Sandinistan anti-Semitism.109 In 1985, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, an American 
based NGO that promotes diplomacy and human rights throughout the Americas, found that 
while there was an anti-Israel “mood” in Nicaragua, it detected “no evidence of systematic 
repression of the Jewish community or officially sponsored anti-Jewish campaigns.”110 In 
July 1984, the New Jewish Agency undertook a fact-finding trip in Nicaragua and published a 
report which concluded that: 
Charges of Nicaraguan government anti-Semitism cannot be supported; there simply 
is no body of credible evidence to suggest that the Sandinista government has 
pursued or is currently pursuing a policy of discrimination or coercion against Jews, 
or that Jewish people are not welcome to live and work in Nicaragua...Charges of 
anti-Semitism are far too serious an issue to be publicly raised without clear 
substantiation and should not become used as a partisan political gambit in the 
United States.”111  
 
Many non-Jewish Americans also supported the idea that Nazi comparisons used by Reagan’s 
administration were inappropriate.112 
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Israel’s incentives to partake in Iran-Contra was not due to exaggerated fears of the 
PLO in Latin America or false claims of Sandinistan anti-Semitism. Instead, Israel’s 
incentives were due to the need to maintain Israeli military alliances at a time when most 
countries had cut them off, as well as to perpetuate the Iran-Iraq war so that neither country 
could pose a threat to Israel. Therefore, Israeli motivations were so great that Tel-Aviv 
possessed significant agency when it came to dealing arms with the Contras and Iranians. The 
only American president that tried to prevent arms delivered to Nicaragua and Iran was 
Jimmy Carter - even his track record is mixed. During Carter’s administration in the late 
1970s, there were several incidents when the United States ordered Israel to halt arms 
shipments to Nicaragua and Iran but it proved difficult for the United States to prevent Israel 
from doing so.  
 
Israeli Agency 
American attempts to prevent Israel from arms dealing 
The first major incident occurred on June 14 1978, when the US officially requested 
an Israeli ship loaded with arms for Nicaragua to turn back.113 Although the Israeli ship 
reluctantly obeyed this order, an official of Carter’s administration later announced that the 
US was reversing its policy and “had decided against trying to prevent Israel from supplying 
light arms” to the Somoza regime due to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 
successful insistence that the arms were vital for Israel’s interests. 114 
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The second major incident was during the last week of June 1979, three weeks before 
Somoza was forced into exile. The US requested that Israeli recall two patrol boats that were 
on their way to Nicaragua. Somoza responded to the request by stating “somewhere in Israel 
there is a large consignment of arms and ammunition which could have saved Nicaragua.”115 
Somoza went on to specify that these were “lifesaving arms that could spell the outcome of 
the war. There was abundant ammunition and more than ten thousand antitank and 
antipersonnel grenade rifles.”116 The Israeli decision to withdraw the boats had little to do 
with American ‘control’ over Israel; in June 1979 both the United States and Israel realised 
that Somoza’s defeat was practically inevitable and that any more weapons sent to him would 
be a lost cause.117 In addition, both the US and Israel feared that since Somoza’s days were 
numbered, any new weapons might end up in the hands of the Sandinistas. 
The third major incident occurred at the beginning of 1980, when Carter faced 
accusations of being weak due to the embassy hostage crisis. Carter intervened in a deal that 
Begin had already approved to send tires for Phantom fighter planes to Iran. Carter insisted 
that the shipments be delayed until after the hostages were released and engaged with a bitter 
argument with Begin.118 This example demonstrated that even though Carter successfully 
delayed the shipment of tires for a few months before he left office, the United States could 
not stop its closest Middle-Eastern ally from negotiating with what Carter considered to be an 
unnegotiable enemy.119 Six months after Reagan was sworn into office, Israel sent its first 
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major shipments of offensive weapons to the Khomeini regime three years before the United 
States started to directly sell armaments.120  
The time lag between Israeli shipments and American shipments suggest that the US 
undertook a policy based upon Israeli blueprints. Nimrod Novik, Senior Foreign Policy 
Advisor to Shimon Peres, stated that he met with many US government officials who made it 
clear that the US “wanted Israel’s help on matters of considerable sensitivity.”121 Novik 
explained that the working relationship was very much based upon the US asking Israel for 
help and not the other way around. In 1983, US Undersecretary of State, Lawrence 
Eagleburger objected to Israel’s independent deals and Tel Aviv responded by giving “no firm 
assurances it would stop arming [Iran].”122 
 
How Israeli investments in Iran-Contra were on par with the US 
After Reagan came to power, the US stopped openly restricting Israeli shipments as 
Reagan was largely dismissive of Carter’s human rights rhetoric. However, Reagan was still 
confined by the “Vietnam syndrome”, widespread public resistance to having young 
Americans fighting and dying in a distant third world conflict, and had to maintain support 
for the Contras without too much public involvement. This strategic doctrine became known 
as “Low-Intensity Conflict for post-Vietnam intervention” and was best defined by the 
                                           
120 Israeli Historical Chronology, Part I, pp. 19–23, 63. 
 
121 Nimrod Novik, interview with the author, November 15, 2007. Byrne, Iran-Contra. Reagan's Scandal and 
the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power, 65. 
 
122 U.S. Department of State, Cable Baghdad 2745, “Iraqi Views on Iran-Iraq War and Lebanon,” November 9, 
1983. This confidential cable reports on a conversation between U.S. diplomat Robin Raphel and a senior Iraqi 
Foreign Ministry official, in which Raphel insisted the United States had “strongly urged the Israelis, to the 
extent that they [are] selling arms to Iran, to cease such activities.” Raphel told the Iraqi, “We had given this 




February 1981 Covert Action Proposal for Central America.123 The justification behind these 
actions was a revised fear of the domino effect theory and the Soviet “export of revolution,” 
despite the fact that the Soviet Union had very little presence beyond Cuba within Latin 
America and that even Khomeini’s Iran considered the USSR a threat.124 American diplomat 
and ambassador to West Germany Richard Burt supported a stronger stance against the Soviet 
Union in Latin America, stating “I think we are seeing the application of the domino theory… 
and I think it’s time the people of the United States realize…. That we’re the last domino.”125 
This new doctrine relied upon secret and complex military connections with allies in order to 
maintain influence without high profile wars and visible casualties. The most important of 
these allies was Israel, who was not proving as reliable as the United States hoped.  
Israel often failed to inform the United States of arms deals until after they were 
concluded and sometimes did not even bother informing the US. The quantity and quality of 
Israeli shipments to Iran and Nicaragua were on par with the United States. By the end of 
1981, the CIA reported Israel had sold at least $28 million in military equipment to Iran.126 
According to Ahmad Haidari, a prominent Iranian arms dealer, approximately 80% of the 
weapons received from foreign countries between 1981 to 1982 came from Israel,127 whose 
interests, as US National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane acknowledged in a 1985 cable 
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to Secretary of State George Shultz, did not necessarily align with those of the US 
government: 
This situation is loaded with imponderables that call for great caution on our part... 
fraud that seems to accompany so many deals involving arms and Iran and the 
complications arising from our ‘blessing’ an Israel-Iran relationship where Israel’s 
interests and ours are not necessarily the same.”128 
 
In fact, Israeli-made weapons were far more common than American made weapons in 
Central America.129 In addition to the thousands of infantry rifles, Israel sold 12 refurbished 
Dassault Super-Mystere fighter-interceptors to Honduras in early January 1977, the first 
supersonic bombers in Central America.130 Though the majority of the planes were made in 
Israel, they were fitted with American-made Pratt and Whitney engines. By failing to inform 
the American State Department of this transaction, the Israeli sale of these planes technically 
violated the banning of “third-country transfers of US military equipment.” However, the 
incident was settled with little fanfare when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger casually 
accepted Israel’s explanation that it had all been “an honest misunderstanding.”131 Neither 
government requested that Honduras return the planes and Israel continued to do business in 
Central America without heavily informing the United States.  
In July 1981, an Israeli arms dealer brokered a deal with Ahmed Khudari, a weapons 
merchant acting for the Iranian Chief of Staff, and Jawwad Fakih, the Iranian minister of 
defence. The deal was made in Lisbon through a French firm and involved the sale of 200 
million dollars’ worth of 106mm recoilless artillery, mortars, ammunition, communications 
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equipment, and jet tires to Iran.132 The only conditions the Iranians made was that it would 
be publically denied if unrecovered.133 This materiel began to arrive on July 11 1981, hidden 
in an Argentinian cargo plane claiming to be carrying fruits and vegetables.134 However, on 
its third trip to Iran on July 18 1981, the plane crashed on the Soviet-Turkish border exposing 
the arms link between Iran and Israel.135 Nevertheless, minimal media coverage of the 
incident and a concomitant absence of public protest encouraged Israel and Iran to make 
further arms deals. 
In May 1982, Israeli Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon informed the United States 
that another contract had been signed with Iran. Although Israel only informed the US after it 
had already signed the contract, the United States requested that no weapons with American-
made parts be sold in order to avoid a repetition of the “misunderstanding of 1977” as well as 
to prevent publicity over violating the newly passed Boland Amendments. This request had 
no effect on Israel because the Israeli Defence Force already possessed a huge surplus of 
Soviet-made PLO weapons that were abandoned in Lebanon after Yasser Arafat fled to 
Tunis.136 A year later in 1983, the Department of Defence collaborated with the CIA to 
participate in the selling of the captured PLO arms in what was known as Operation Tipped 
Kettle.137 A memorandum written by Oliver North named “Israeli arms” outlined many 
aspects of Tipped Kettle: 
On Friday night, Defence Minister Rabin offered a significant quantity of captured 
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Soviet bloc arms for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. These arms will be 
picked up by a foreign flag vessel this week and delivered to the Nicaraguan 
resistance. If Peres raises this issue, it would be helpful if the President thanked him 
since the Israelis hold considerable stores of bloc ordnance compatible with what the 
Nicaraguan resistance now uses.” 138  
 
Once again, an arms link founded by Israel had been picked up and furthered by the United 
States. 
In September 1982, Israel got a surprising request from Reza Shah’s 20-year-old son 
living in exile in Cairo to use Saudi funds to purchase Israeli arms for training soldiers in 
Sudan to overthrow the Khomeini regime.139 The United States pushed for this plan which 
was given the green light by CIA director William Casey. However, Israel rejected the plan 
due to doubts over the young Reza Shah’s ability to govern effectively as well as the ongoing 
Official Commission of Inquiry into the Sabra and Shatila massacres that forced the 
resignation of Sharon and Begin. Yitzhak Shamir, the new Israeli prime minister, had no faith 
in the Shah-in-exile’s plan and from then on, Israel essentially accepted the new Islamic 
government as a permanently established regime with which to do secret business with.140 
Israel was effectively able to scrap a plan heavily supported by the United States because 
Israeli officials were not convinced it would serve their own domestic and international goals. 
In late 1982, General Gustavo Alvarez, the head of the Honduran armed forces, 
visited Israel in search of warplanes that were an alternative to American models.141 In 
October 1985, Honduras purchased SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles accompanied with IDF 
                                           
138 Oliver North memorandum, “Possible Peres Discussion Items with the President,” September 15, 1986, 
attached to memo from North to John Poindexter, “Follow-on Meeting with Amiram Nir,” September 15, 1986 
 
139 Segev, The Iranian Triangle, 9. 
140 Segev, The Iranian Triangle, 11. 
141 Guardian, October 11, 1985. Ignacio Klich, an Argentine Jewish journalist who has closely followed Israel’s 
Third World involvements. 
Smith 32 
 
advisors.142 The fact that General Alvarez could openly visit Israel to look for weapons as if 
he was in a supermarket demonstrated the reputation of Israel as an international arms dealer 
providing high quality weaponsry. Adolfo Calero, a prominent Contra figure, confirmed in 
April 1984 that his soldiers were looking at Israel as a major source of support since “the 
Israelis would be the best because they have the technical experience.”143  
In 1983 the United States began a project in Costa Rica known as the Northern Zone 
Infrastructure Development Project, officially undertaken to facilitate ‘economic 
development in the Third World through US AID’ (Agency for International 
Development).144 However, it also served as a platform to move anti-communist Costa Rican 
farmers up to the Nicaraguan border, and supply them with infrastructure, credit and technical 
services including up to $14,200,000 in loans and $500,000 in grants.145 These 
infrastructures and ‘technical services’ provided cover for Contra base and training camps 
throughout the area with the purpose of providing a security belt along the Costa Rica-
Nicaraguan border to surround the Sandinistas. Although the official document made no 
mention of the Contras, communism or war, it stated that: 
Costa Rica’s Northern Zone has been designated as a priority region for development 
not only because it has extensive areas of under-utilized lands with agricultural 
potential but for geopolitical reasons as well. The GOCR (Government of Costa 
Rica) is concerned about the feelings of isolation and frustration expressed by the 
population and its proximity to and the constant destabilizing influence from 
Nicaragua.146 
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The movement of farmers to ‘under-utilised lands’ were facilitated by Israeli advisors on the 
ground, following their experiences with settlers in militarily unstable locations.147 In 1985, 
the Costa Rican government announced that it would seek anti-aircraft weapons and high 
calibre machine guns from Israel and other countries.148 The Northern Zone Infrastructure 
Development Project served as another example of a joint US-Israeli effort to covertly secure 
their investments in a Latin American nation through arms sales and advisors in this case, not 
under the rhetoric of fighting communism but for “economic development.”  
On March 27 1984, CIA director William Casey wrote a memo to National Security 
Advisor Robert Carl McFarlane, that “I am in full agreement that you should explore funding 
alternatives with the Israelis and perhaps others”149 This was in response to a prompt that 
stated that the 24 million dollars that was already used for contra arms was starting to run out. 
Casey went on to list other possibilities for funding including the usual suspects of South 
Africa, other central American dictatorships, and Saudi-Arabia.150 Israel was the first country 
mentioned and was repeated more times than any other country. 
In August 1986, a few days before the Iran-Contra scandal broke out in the US, the 
National Security Advisor John Poindexter described his interaction between Israeli Defence 
Minister Yitzahk Rabin to furnish Spanish speaking Israeli military trainers and advisers to 
the Contras in Honduras. These Israeli advisors would also sell Kfir fighters to the Honduran 
government in order to reinforce the border between Nicaragua and Honduras which was 
known as the Southern Front. Even after the scandal was on the front cover of almost every 
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American newspaper in the autumn of 1986, Rabin sent eight tons of seized PLO arms to 
Nicaragua, which was referred to as “Country 1.”151 In 1986, Israel increased its support to 
both the Iranians and the Contras while American support stagnated due to the explosive 
political scandal at home.  
 
US Hearings on Israeli involvement 
US Senate hearings discussed Israeli involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair early in 
1986 and acknowledged that the United States had based many of its policies on Israeli 
intelligence. On February 27 1986, a Senate Hearing entitled “US policy toward Nicaragua: 
aid to Nicaraguan resistance proposal” admitted that an estimate of $26 million from private 
groups in the US, Western Europe, South America, Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel had been 
donated to the FDN, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, one branch of the Contras.152 It is 
likely that the $26 million figure is an underestimate given the lack of transparency of many 
transactions. Israel and France were mentioned at least two more times in the document when 
it came to specifying the sources of rebel armaments and funding. 
On January 14 1987, another Senate Hearing entitled “United States policy toward 
Iran” involved an exchange between Kentucky Republican Senator Mitch McConnell and 
former National Security Advisor Robert Carl McFarlane, who had resigned in 1985.153 The 
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hearing concluded that “the sale of arms to Iran and reported approval of Israeli shipments of 
United States-supplied arms to Iran, without notice to Congress either prior to or promptly 
after the shipments took place, appear to have violated several Federal statutes.”154 
McConnell followed this declaration with a series of questions that stated how baffled he was 
over the extent of American policy that relied upon Israeli intelligence. As in the 
‘misunderstanding of 1977,’ the Israelis were able to violate American law with no 
repercussions to their alliance, even though vice-president George H.W. Bush had expressed 
the concern that Tel Aviv held too much leverage with Washington and that the “Israelis may 
squeeze us.”155 
McConnell specifically questioned an American plan to identify ‘moderate’ elements 
within the Iranian revolution with particular emphasis on Hussein-Ali Montezeri, a potential 
successor of Khomeini who eventually fell out with the supreme leader and was branded a 
counterrevolutionary in late 1987.156 In reality, the entire ‘moderate’ proposal was made up 
by Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar and Saudi billionaire Adnan Khashoggi. These 
two figures hoped to cash in on the Iran-Iraq war and used their business links to sell 
weapons to Iran via Israel. Much of Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi’s involvement was revealed 
during the hearings, including Oliver North’s larger set of deposits, which included $15 
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million from Khashoggi and $1.685 from Israel.157 
Ghorbanifar and Israeli officials discussed how using the term ‘moderates’ would 
encourage increased American arms sales.158 McFarlane found that the “original presentation 
to us we found credible came from Israel [later identified as official government sources], but 
that we did make our own independent efforts to determine whether their own conclusions [in 
regards to the moderates] were reasonable.” These independent efforts that were never further 
explained. In fact, the US had little independent intelligence; this violation of federal law was 
undertaken with almost completely fabricated data produced mainly by Israel. Even Oliver 
North recognised that “our greatest liability throughout has been lack of operational control 
over transactions with Ghorbanifar [alongside his Israeli counterparts].”159 The United States 
was simply not willing to openly criticise Israel due to the perceived value of the intelligence 
that they contributed to the US. 
McConnell continued his interrogation by asking McFarlane to confirm that “we 
relied exclusively on the advice of others [Israel] as to what individuals in those various 
groups might comprise this moderate element?” McFarlane replied, “That’s correct. We 
really had no alternative.” McFarlane’s testimony concerning the US’s lack of influence in 
Iran and its reliance on allies was reinforced by a 1985 CIA formal analysis known as a 
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on the subject of Khomeini’s Iran and 
supposed Soviet influence. The documented stated that: 
The United States is unlikely to be able to directly influence Iranian events, given its 
current lack of contact or presence in Iran. European states and other friendly 
states—including Turkey, Pakistan, China, Japan, and even Israel—can provide the 
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next most valuable presence or entrée in Iran to help protect Western interests.160 
 
An astonished McConnell responded to McFarlane and asked “was it not from July until 
December, before we made any direct contact ourselves, and did anything other than simply 
rely on the Israelis?” McFarlane replied: 
Well sir, the President’s approval came in August 1985. That authority was that if 
Israel were to sell arms to Iran, and ultimately came to the United States to replace 
them, that they could do that, so long as the quantity shipped and the character of the 
weapons wouldn’t alter the complexion of the situation in the war or contribute to 
terrorism.161 
 
McFarlane’s insistence that such actions could continue as long as it wouldn’t ‘alter the 
complexion of war or contribute to terrorism’ was purposely vague and ambiguous language 
that allowed for the continuation of the policy of allowing and supporting covert Israeli arms 
sales.  
By 1988, the US and Israel were meeting with considerable international criticism 
over their involvement in Nicaragua. One United Nations General Assembly resolution 
passed in October 1988 ordered the United States to end the arming and training of insurgents 
against Nicaragua and to pay the damages caused by military attacks; the only two countries 
to vote against this resolution were Israel and the United States.162  
 By 1984, western mainstream news stations were openly reporting on the Israeli 
involvement in Central America. Despite the international condemnation of Israeli presence 
in Nicaragua, the Israeli government continued to deny their involvement.  
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The embellishment of Oliver North’s significance 
The American media frenzy over Oliver North contributed to the lack of large public 
outcry over other international contributors to Iran-Contra. North’s face is immediately 
associated with Irangate as Richard Nixon’s name is with Watergate. However, unlike 
Nixon’s connection to Watergate, North’s actual involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair was 
relatively minor. North essentially ‘took the bullet’ for Reagan, allowing himself to be 
painted as a rouge agent who went too far while Reagan remained ignorant of the arms 
deals.163 Although Reagan’s opinion polls were damaged by Irangate, his administration did 
not become synonymous with scandal,164 even Oliver North’s reputation remained partially 
intact, as he later received credit as a “misguided patriot” willing to sacrifice his career for 
the greater good of his country.165 But, in fact the foundations of the arms deals were already 
set by Israel’s long history of selling armaments to Central American dictatorships and the 
Shah; the channels of weapons shipments were already in use by the time North was in a 
position of authority. North simply built on the groundwork laid by Israel to continue to foster 
the American commitment to fight those who challenged US interests in Nicaragua and Iran. 
North was not alone in his commitment to supplying arms to Central American 
rebels. Other significant American agents included Richard Secord, John Singlaub, and 
Ronald Martin, all of whom had directly contacted and negotiated with Contra leader Adolfo 
Calero.166Another Department of Defence official, John Poindexter, facilitated a 
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communications system called the Private Blank Check. This system, although ultimately a 
failure, initially allowed North and Poindexter to communicate without being detected by the 
National Security Council computer.167 Although North held senior positions to these men, 
the activities undertaken could not have been accomplished without their involvement. The 
head of the CIA, Willian J. Casey, was also involved in Irancontra but the extent of his 
involvement is not known in much detail due to a brain tumour that left Casey incapable of 
speech during the hearings shortly before his death in 1987.168 Casey’s senior and influential 
position in the CIA has made many speculate if he was even more involved in Irangate than 
North, despite the lack of any solid evidence. Donald Regan, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
was also forced to resign due to his involvement in Irangate. Like Casey, the extent of 
Regan’s involvement is still unknown.169 
 
Israeli involvement and denial in news media 
Although, Israel’s involvement was revealed during the US congressional hearings, 
the lack of a central figure like North meant that the Israeli public took little notice of the 
proceedings. On April 23 1984, Yossi Amihud, spokesperson for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
denied that “Israel had any military relationship with El Salvador.”170 However, on that very 
same day NBC broadcast an interview with a Contra leader and former Somozan National 
Guardsmen where he stated that “we received some weapons...that [the] Israeli government 
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took from [the] PLO in Lebanon.” The broadcast added that the rebels were known to use 
Soviet-made machine guns, and that Israel “has armed a quarter of the rebel army.”171  
On April 27 1984, an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that “normally we 
do not discuss arms sales at all, but this allegation is so baseless and casts such a slur upon 
Israel’s image that we decided to make a public denial.”172 The Miami Herald reported on 
more Israeli officials denying their involvement with the Contras on April 29.173 On May 7 
1984, Time magazine reported that “Israel funnels arms to the contras through the Honduran 
army. Israeli intelligence experts have helped the CIA train the contras, and retired or reserve 
Israeli army commandos have been hired by shadowy private firms to assist the rebels.”174 
On October 8 1985, the Houston Chronicle reported an approved plan early in 1985 for secret 
funding if Congress cut off military aid to the contras.175 On that same day, the Washington 
Post identified South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel as major creditors of rebel funding.176  
All of Israel’s denials were revealed to be lies only a few months or a couple of years 
after they were announced, exposed by the US Congressional Hearings as well as by 
interviews with Contra leaders that revealed the source of their weapons. Because so many 
mainstream newspapers reported on Israeli involvement in Central America as early as 1984, 
it is not surprising that it took only until August 1985 for the American connection to be 
revealed in this global scandal. It is also not surprising that Israel did not receive the same 
backlash as the US; news was delivered to the US public as a sudden large dose of 
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information in 1986 while the Israeli public was exposed to the allegations in small doses 
spread throughout the 1980s. 
 
Conclusion 
Israeli agency in the Iran-Contra affair was demonstrated by its long standing 
histories in Nicaragua and Iran, its independent ambitions in these regions, and its ability to 
ignore the most powerful country in the world. For many decades, Israel independently built 
up economic and military ties to Nicaragua and Iran and felt threatened by the revolutions of 
1979. Therefore, even though many of its goals coincided with the United States, they were 
not identical. The United States’ inability to control its most significant Middle-Eastern ally is 
a fundamental piece of evidence that revealed Israel’s international independence. 
When categorising countries’ loyalty during the Cold War, many automatically put 
Israel directly into the American camp as opposed to the Soviet camp or the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Although this categorisation is true for some aspects of Israel’s history, it neglects 
the domestically orientated motives of Israel and its incentives. Many countries, like Israel, 
did not fit neatly into the bipolar sets that Cold War ideology designates. When it came to 
Iran, Nicaragua, and arms deals, Israel acted more like a non-aligned country than one 
fighting the American war against communism. 
Israel was an American ally; but it also independently pursued its own ambitions. 
The myth of Cold War bipolarism and the complexities of international arms deals can be 
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